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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between human resource practices, operational 
outcomes, and economic performance in call centers.   The study draws on a sample of 64 call 
centers serving the mass market in a large telecommunications services company.  Surveys of 
1,243 employees in the 64 centers were aggregated to the call center level and matched to 
archival data on service process quality, as measured by customer surveys; call handling time, 
revenues per call, and net revenues per call.  Our path analysis shows that human resource 
practices emphasizing employee training, discretion, and rewards lead to higher service quality, 
higher revenues per call, and higher net revenues per call.  In addition, service quality mediates 
the relationship between human resource practices and these economic outcomes. There is no 
significant relationship between HR practices and labor efficiency, as measured by call handling 
time; and labor efficiency is inversely related to revenue generation. 
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Human Resource Practices, Service Quality, 
 and Economic Performance in Call Centers 
 
1. Introduction 
 Understanding the factors that influence economic performance in call centers is an 
important subject of research for management science and managerial practice.  The subject is 
timely for management science because our empirical evidence on performance relies heavily 
on the experience of manufacturing operations.  Interactive service settings such as call centers 
differ from manufacturing in important ways, including the relative tangibility of output, the level 
of interdependence among workers, and the role of the customer in the production process.  For 
managers, call center performance is of strategic importance because these centers 
increasingly have become the central mechanism through which firms interact with their 
customers, and hence, shape buying behavior and sales revenues.   While call centers have 
historically been viewed as cost centers, with savings generated through automation and 
economies of scale, firms increasingly position these operations as profit centers, in which 
service and sales activities together generate revenues. 
However, many call centers continue to operate as if they are cost centers, focusing on 
such efficiency metrics as call handling time and customers per employee per day, even though 
profits may depend more on revenue generation.  This cost focus translates into human 
resource systems that also emphasize cost minimization -- low levels of training, employee 
discretion, and incentives – resulting in high absenteeism and turnover.  With turnover rates of 
30 to 50 percent or more, employee retention is a widely recognized problem in call centers, 
customer satisfaction with call centers is notoriously low (54 percent satisfaction by one survey, 
Purdue University 1999), and customer complaints on internet websites such as 
planetfeedback.com or complaints.com are high.   
While the cost center model may apply to simple tasks, such as credit card activation, is 
it the right business model for most centers, which serve the mass market – where demand for 
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service bundling, ‘one-stop shopping’, or ‘mass customization’ (Pine, 1993) is prevalent?  What 
type of human resource system fits the characteristics in sectors such as insurance, banking, 
telecommunications, utilities, and after sales service for manufactured goods?   
In this paper we examine two questions.  First, to what extent do human resource 
practices explain variation in the economic outcomes of call centers?  And second, what 
operational outcomes mediate the relationship between human resource practices and 
economic outcomes?  More specifically, how important is the quality of service delivery for 
economic outcomes?  Are there trade offs between service quality and labor efficiency?   We 
contribute to the research literature by assessing whether performance models developed in the 
service management literature apply to call centers serving price-conscious, mass market 
customers. We also examine relationships among operational and economic outcomes net of 
labor inputs, which much of the prior literature has failed to do (Cappelli & Neumark, 2001).  
While labor costs in manufacturing have fallen sharply in recent years and often represent less 
than a quarter of costs, in interactive service activities, labor represents 50 percent of costs at a 
minimum.  Investing in the skills and abilities of the workforce may exceed the economic 
benefits. 
We explore these questions through a study of 64 call centers in a former Bell operating 
company.  This market offers opportunities for mass customization: service and sales activities 
are moderately complex, with employees handling billing inquiries and complaints, on the one 
hand, and selling packages of local, long distance, and internet connections and special 
features, on the other.  The context for the research also provides a relatively tough test for 
whether variation in human resource practices affects performance because the call centers are 
located within one business unit of a company, serve the same customer segment, use similar 
call center technology, and operate under the same corporate business and human resource 
strategies.  We investigate variation in areas where call center managers have discretion: with 
respect to training decisions, work design, and use of incentives to motivate workers.  If service 
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quality matters in these price-conscious markets, then the findings are likely to generalize to 
higher value-added settings where quality and customization are more recognized as important 
for competitiveness. 
2.  Prior Research 
Research in service management draws on insights from marketing, operations 
management, and organizational behavior to provide a theoretical framework for the factors that 
shape organizational performance.  That literature suggests that competing on service quality 
and investing in human resource systems are particularly important for interactive service 
activities, defined as those that are produced through the interaction of employees and 
customers (Leidner, 1993).  The argument builds on the idea that interactive service work differs 
from goods production in fundamental ways.  While this is not to suggest that human resource 
practices are unimportant in manufacturing -- a large body of industry studies shows that they 
are (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; MacDuffie, 1995) -- the service management 
literature draws out the specific ways that HR systems are likely to affect performance in 
interactive services.  Typologies vary in degree of complexity and detail, but most converge on 
four core differences: intangibility, heterogeneity (or variability) due to customers as co-
producers, perishability of output (no inventory), and simultaneity of production and 
consumption (Lovelock, 2005).   In the following discussion, we explore implications of these 
arguments for human resource management and service performance. 
The intangibility of service activities suggests that the process of delivery is as important, 
or more important, than the output.  Customers consume a process rather than output 
(Gronroos, 1990).  While the degree of intangibility varies across tasks and industries, the 
customers’ experience of the process of delivery is central to their perception of quality.  
Because service activities are more intangible than not, quality is also difficult to measure.   The 
most widely accepted measurement model of service quality (SERVQUAL), developed over 
years of empirical research in marketing, identifies five dimensions of quality:  tangibles, 
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reliability (consistency), assurance (how confident the customer is about the service being 
provided), responsiveness (to the customer’s demands), and empathy (for the customer) 
(Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 1990).  The empirical evidence shows that satisfaction with 
tangibles accounts for just 11 percent of total satisfaction.  Technology solutions are effective for 
improving the quality of tangibles and reliability of information processing by eliminating human 
error (Chase & Stewart, 1995).  However, the latter three dimensions, which account for almost 
60% of customer satisfaction scores, are primarily driven by the ability of employees to respond 
to customers.  Hence, strategies to improve the quality of the service process depend 
importantly on investment in human resource systems, including training in products, processes, 
and interaction skills; work designed to provide sufficient discretion for employees to respond to 
customers in a timely and effective manner; and incentives to motivate effort.   
The fact that customers are co-producers in the process also has important implications.  
The heterogeneous preferences of customers introduce variability and uncertainty into the 
production process, and this has led operations management to conceptualize customers as 
‘partial employees’ and to develop strategies to control their behaviour (Chase, 1978; Mills, 
Chase, & Marguiles, 1983).  Management has considerable choice in the design of service 
operations (Chase & Tansik, 1983), and call centers represent one solution for turning high 
contact interactions (with high levels of variability) into low contact ones, with efficiency gains 
through automation and standardization.  Even in these standardized environments, however, 
customers may reject menu-driven options or insist on their preferences, so that the quality of 
service delivery depends importantly on the skills and capabilities of the frontline workforce to 
manage customer behavior and negotiate solutions to non-routine requests. 
The concept of simultaneity of production and consumption puts additional demands on 
human resource management – arguably adding to the importance of first time quality. 
Managers cannot easily intervene directly in a customer-employee interaction as it occurs.  
There is no functional equivalent of ‘stopping the line’, as is found in quality management in 
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manufacturing.   Moreover, marketing research has shown that a negative interaction between a 
customer and employee has far more impact on customer behavior than a positive interaction 
(Gronroos, 1990).   Thus, human resource practices that directly control employee behavior 
(through specific performance objectives and evaluations) are not particularly effective in this 
context.  For example, call center studies have shown that job routinization and pervasive 
electronic monitoring for performance management are associated with emotional exhaustion 
and burnout (Carayon, 1993; Deery, Iverson, & Walsh, 2002; Holman, Chissick, & Totterdell, 
2002; Singh, 2000).  These, in turn, predict absenteeism (Deery et al., 2002) and lower self-
reported service quality (Singh, 2000).  Arguably, indirect methods of control, such as training 
and incentives, are more effective because they create behavioral norms for customer service 
delivery.  
This line of argument is central to the service climate literature (Bowen & Schneider, 
1988; Schneider & Bowen, 1985) and the service profit chain argument  (Heskett, Sasser, & 
Schlesinger, 1997).  The central insight is that management can use human resource practices 
to create a climate or environment for providing good customer service; what employees 
experience at work -- positively or negatively – motivates them to provide good or bad service; 
and this shapes customers’ satisfaction and willingness to purchase future services.  Employee 
motivation is the underlying causal theory, and is typically measured by employee satisfaction.   
Most evidence for these arguments comes from individual case studies, but some 
quantitative studies in the banking sector report a significant positive correlation between 
employee perceptions of service climate and customer reports of service quality (Borucki & 
Burke, 1999; Johnson, 1996; Peccei & Rosenthal, 2000; Schmit & Allscheid, 1995) and financial 
performance (Borucki et al., 1999).  However, some studies show a reciprocal relationship 
between service climate and customer perceptions of quality (Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998).  
Moreover, there is little evidence of employee satisfaction as mediating the relationship between 
human resource practices and customer satisfaction (Korczynski, 2002). An exception is 
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Sargeant and Frenkel (2000), who found support for the role of employee satisfaction and 
commitment, although this study was based on a single-source survey.   
Support for the service profit chain argument comes from Loveman’s (1998) study of 479 
branches of a regional bank, which demonstrated a series of correlations along links of the 
service profit chain.  Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, and Allen (2005) also found that employee 
commitment and customer satisfaction mediated the relationship between HR practices and 
profitability, although the context was a business-to-business supply chain.   
Another line of argument links human resource investments to better performance, not 
via employee attitudes but via their effects on worker skills, knowledge, and problem-solving 
capabilities.  For example, Batt (1999) found that sales reps in self-directed work groups 
generated significantly higher revenues (net of labor costs), than did traditionally-supervised 
groups, and accomplished this in part through better use of technology.  Another national study 
of 350 US call centers found that the use of high involvement practices (defined as investments 
in skills and training, collaborative work design to allow discretion and collaboration, and 
incentives based on pay and employment security) was associated with significantly lower quit 
rates and higher sales growth.  These findings lend support to the idea that HR practices 
improve employee retention and build the kind of firm-specific human capital that results in 
higher productivity; but this study did not control for labor costs (Batt, 2002).  
Thus, whether it is through employee motivation or capability, existing literature suggests 
that call centers that provide training, discretion, and rewards for good service and sales will 
have higher service quality and higher economic outcomes than those that do not. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
H1: Establishments with human resource practices that provide employees with training, 
discretion to meet customer needs, and rewards for using their skills and discretion 
effectively will have higher customer service quality and better economic outcomes 
H2: Service quality will partially mediate the relationship between human resource 
practices and economic outcomes. 
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 We make no hypotheses regarding the relationship between human resource practices 
and call handling time because we view this as an empirical question, which we explore in the 
analyses below.  On the one hand, investments in human resource practices can allow 
employees to handle customer inquiries more efficiently, leading to lower call handling times.  
On the other hand, these practices can provide employees with the skills and motivation to 
probe customer demands, suggest bundles of services, and negotiate over sales packages.  
This would result in longer call handling time.  Thus, the net effect of these two dynamics is an 
empirical question. 
2.2 Service Quality, Efficiency, and Economic Outcomes 
The second question we address is whether better economic outcomes are linked to 
both high service quality and labor efficiency, or whether there are trade-offs between these 
intermediate outcomes.  This question depends in part on how quality is defined, and there are 
several perspectives (Garvin, 1984; Reeves & Bednar, 1994).  In the manufacturing or 
operations management perspective, improving quality and efficiency are viewed as 
complementary. That is because conformance to specifications forms a major part of the 
definition of quality (Garvin, 1984): ‘quality is free’ (Crosby, 1979).  By reducing variances in the 
production process, conformance of products to specifications increases.  First time quality 
improves and rework and defects are reduced, leading to better quality and labor efficiency.   
Zimmerman and Enell have applied this line of reasoning to service activities (1988).  
Call centers can improve reliability (conformance to specifications) by automating call flows and 
reducing the impact of human error; this reduces rework and also increases the speed of 
handling transactions, thereby improving labor efficiency.  This approach to quality encourages 
call centers to focus on reducing call handling time.  It assumes that the information processing 
needed for service and sales transactions can be standardized to such an extent that the need 
for human skills and interpretation is minimal.  In the example of the telecommunications call 
centers in this study, employees would click user-friendly boxes for each added feature that a 
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customer wants, complete the sale, and move on to the next customer.  Low call handling time 
would equate to higher numbers of customers served and sales made, and thus net revenues 
would be higher when call handling time is lower.  This logic also draws on Taylorist principles 
of work organization, in which tasks are simplified in order to maximize volumes and minimize 
costs at the level of individual tasks (Taylor, 1911).  Leading management theorists have 
advocated this approach to services to reduce labor intensity (Levitt, 1972).  Using this line of 
argument, the focus of operations management is to continually seek ways to reduce call 
handling time, either by standardizing call options or shifting labor to customers through self-
service venues.  These strategies, however, may backfire if customers perceive that their 
options are too limited or that their costs of accessing the service are too great (Lovelock, 
2005).  
The marketing discipline, by contrast, defines quality as meeting or exceeding the 
expectations of customers (Zeithaml et al., 1990).  More importantly, the fact that customers are 
part of the production process opens up new avenues for marketing, thereby decentralizing that 
function.  The concept of interactive marketing (Gronroos, 1990) captures the idea that every 
service encounter becomes an opportunity to sell.  Those employees who are more skilled at 
‘bridging to sales’ will typically take longer with each customer and handle fewer customers per 
day, but overall will produce higher sales revenues by packaging bundles of higher value added 
products.  It is in the interest of the marketing function, therefore, for employees to ‘get close to 
the customer’: spend as long as it takes to build an understanding of customer characteristics 
and buying habits, create bundled service packages, and develop a ‘relationship’ that yields 
repeated purchases and loyalty to the brand.  By this definition, service quality and labor 
efficiency are tradeoffs – the opposite of the assumption found in operations management.  
Longer calls are associated with higher service quality and economic benefits. 
A number of empirical studies suggest that in call centers, the marketing logic 
dominates.   Managers view service and sales goals and call handling goals as competing 
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(Frenkel, Korczynski, Shire, & Tam, 1999; Korczynski, 2002).  The call handling metrics derived 
from electronic monitoring systems put constant pressure on managers to increase calls per 
employee per day and reduce labor costs.  However, managers are rated on customer 
satisfaction and sales goals as well.  They believe that if they focus too much on quality, labor 
efficiency will go down; but if they focus too much on call volumes per employee, worker 
absenteeism and turnover will increase and customers will defect.  Employees also experience 
the twin goals of limiting call handling time versus meeting service and sales goals as 
contradictory. 
The service profit chain model, described above, takes a fairly universalistic approach to 
the value of relationship management, suggesting that customer satisfaction is an important 
driver in all markets.  However, recent critics have challenged this notion, arguing that quality 
strategies for low-value added customers don’t pay off.  Since the overwhelming majority of 
profits come from a small minority of customers that purchase value-added products and 
services (the 80-20 rule), the costs of service quality should be calibrated to the value-added of 
particular customers (Reinartz & Kumar, 2002).  Many companies, in fact, have segmented their 
markets by the value added of customers, and have matched labor costs – investments in 
human resource systems – to the value of each segment.  This has allowed call centers to 
adopt a cost-dominated model for price-conscious mass markets and a quality-professional 
model for high value-added markets serving business customers (Batt, 2002).  This stratification 
of management models by customer segment also suggests that the dominant view among 
service providers is that there is a necessary trade-off between labor efficiency and service 
quality – or as suggested by Cappelli and Neumark (2001), the costs of investing in human 
resource systems outweigh the benefits in price conscious markets.  This may also be due to 
the fact that labor costs typically represent over 50 percent of costs in these types of service 
environments. 
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In sum, service management studies support the idea that labor efficiency is inversely 
related to service quality and revenue generation, suggesting the hypothesis that: 
H3: Longer call handling time will be positively related to revenue generation. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Hypothesized Model of HR Practices, Operational Outcomes, 
and Economic Performance 
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caller ID; and high speed internet access and second lines to homes.  They do not handle 
wireless services.   
Because the call centers are organized under one line of business in one company, 
there are few external sources of variation – such as variation in product or customer markets, 
type of technology employed, corporate business strategies, and the like.  In addition, the 
sample of call centers is under the leadership of the same business unit vice-president and 
thus, subject to the similar overall human resource policies.  A union contract covers all 
customer service employees, so that there is also little variation in wages and benefits, job 
posting and bidding procedures, dispute resolution and grievance procedures, or due process 
for disciplinary cases.   
In our field research, we found that call center managers did have some discretion over 
workforce management decisions and took different approaches.  They differed in how much of 
their budgets went to training, who received what kind of training, how they managed 
supervisors, how much discretion with customers they encouraged employees to take, and what 
kinds of group and individual performance incentives they used.  
The project involved three phases of data collection over a three-year period.  In the first 
phase, we conducted site visits to 15 call centers across the company.  Based on these visits, 
we developed call-center specific survey questions to capture variation in management 
practices.  Each site visit consisted of semi-structured interviews with the general manager, 
manager of information technology, HR manager, supervisors, and focus groups of employees.  
We also sat and observed the work of several employees and listened in on their interactions 
with customers.   
In the second phase, we administered a survey to a random sample of employees in 
May, 2001.  We surveyed 16 percent of employees in each call center with more than 40 
employees.   Respondents took the survey on company time and returned it in a pre-addressed, 
stamped envelope directly to the researchers.  The employee survey response rate was 59%, 
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yielding a total of 1,243 completed surveys.  The third phase of the study involved the collection 
of archival performance data, including information from the Human Resource Information 
System (HRIS), the call center electronic monitoring system, archival data on sales, and 
customer satisfaction surveys conducted by a third party vendor.  The monitoring system tracks 
the minute by minute performance of individual employees on a variety of dimensions, such as 
call handling time.  We aggregated the survey data to the call center level and then matched it 
to the objective performance data obtained from company archives.  
3.2  Sample 
The sample includes 64 call centers.   The mean number of survey respondents per call 
center was 21, with a range of 6 to 55 (the range reflects the variation in the size of call 
centers).  Of the subjects who responded, 78% were female and 52% were married. The 
average age of the participants was 36 years, with a range of 27 to 49.   Average organizational 
tenure was 5.9 years (ranging from 9 months to 16 years).  The average salary was $42,514, 
ranging from $33,042 to $48,940, with this variation reflecting a seniority-based union pay scale 
and overtime pay.  The typical employee has a high school degree plus one or two years of 
college education (16 percent have a high school degree; 45 percent have some college 
education; 14 percent have a 2-year college degree; and 21 percent have a 4-year college 
degree).   Representatives typically spent 85% of their day on the phone handling incoming 
calls. They served an average of 50 customers per day and had an average interaction time 
with customers of 8 minutes.   
3.3  Measurement of Variables 
For the outcome variables in this study, the company provided archival data on the 
following performance metrics: call handling time, revenues per call, costs per call, and 
customer satisfaction data for the period of January through May, 2001.  The satisfaction data 
comes from an outside vender, who randomly contacts a sample of customers of each center 
each month and surveys them on their satisfaction with service.  Of an initial 73 call centers in 
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the survey, we could obtain complete satisfaction data for 65.  The 65 sites that had customer 
satisfaction data did not significantly differ from the 8 that did not in terms of rewards and work 
design HR practices.  There were significant differences between centers with and without 
satisfaction data in the amount of initial training and training in the last six months. Centers with 
satisfaction data provided on average 5 weeks of initial training and 50 hours of training in the 
prior 6 months.  Centers without satisfaction data provided, on average, 4 weeks of initial 
training and 8 hours of training in the last six months.  Though these differences may indicate a 
response bias affecting the mean levels, it is not clear that this would bias results regarding 
correlations. 
Service quality. To measure the quality of the service process, we developed an index 
based on six questions from the customer satisfaction survey administered for the company by 
a third party vendor.  The telephone interview used a Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 5= 
strongly agree) to rate customer satisfaction.  Of 9 items in the survey, we used the six which 
capture dimensions of the service process over which the employees have some influence.  
Items included satisfaction with the service providers’:  “understanding your needs”, “ability to 
handle your request”, “willingness to handle your request”, “handling call efficiently”, “courtesy of 
the representative”, and “overall rating of the rep”.  We created a mean composite of the survey 
items and aggregated it across five months of service quality data.  
Labor efficiency.  Labor efficiency is the average of 5 months of data on the call handling 
time per employee per call center. 
Economic outcomes.  Economic outcomes are measured by revenues per call and net 
revenues per call over a 5 month period.  An alternative measure of economic performance is 
revenues per employee; however, that does not take into consideration variation in hours of 
work across work sites.  Thus, revenues per call provides a more accurate measure.  Total 
sales revenues are used in the equations in which we estimate the relationship between 
customer satisfaction and call handling time.  Net revenues per call was calculated as total 
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revenues per call minus operational costs per call.  Note that this measure is viewed by 
company managers as call center ‘profits’.  However, in reality, the measure does not take into 
account the costs associated with the actual installation of telecommunications services done by 
field technicians.  Hence, when these costs are taken into account, actual profitability is lower.  
The independent variables in the study are organizational-level measures of human 
resource practices, created by averaging the individual survey responses at each call center.  
Training.  Training is an additive index of training reported by employees at three points 
in time.  The three questions asked about: the amount of initial training received, the amount of 
on the job training following initial training, and the amount of training in the last six months (α = 
.50,  ICC(1)= .20, ICC(2)= .76).  Because initial and on-going training can be complements or 
substitutes, we do not expect the correlation between the two to be high; rather we use the 
additive index to capture the total amount of training provided.  Training focused on skill 
development in three areas: product knowledge, social interaction and sales skills, and technical 
skills for computer use and information processing.  Initial training covers all of these aspects of 
the job and is provided at the center level.  In addition, managers offer on-going training as 
needed.  In some instances, this may be mandated by the company if a new product, marketing 
strategy, or IT system update is introduced, hence the importance of controlling for region.  
However, we interviewed managers who also made decisions to spend money for on-going 
training based on their assessment of training needs, and this training could include any of the 
three skill domains. 
Discretion. Our measure of discretion was developed from our fieldwork and is 
contextually specific.  It is an additive index based on four questions that capture different 
dimensions of serving customers and meeting their needs.  Respondents were asked “how 
much discretion you have in making customer-related decisions” (1 = no discretion…5 = 
complete discretion) for the following activities: adjusting prices over and above fixed rates or 
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tariffs, waiving late penalties or other similar fees, switching a customer to a more suitable 
product, extending a deadline (α=.56,  ICC(1)=.18, ICC(2)=.81). 
Rewards.  We measured rewards by an additive index of two items, also developed from 
our fieldwork and tailored to the specific setting.  As noted above, wages and reward structures 
in this environment were largely set by the union contract, but managers had discretion to use 
non-cash and small cash rewards as incentives to improve service and sales.   Survey 
respondents were asked “When you do your job well, how often are you rewarded with” (1 = 
never…5 = always) the following:  non-cash rewards, (e.g., free lunch or dinner, public 
recognition, or small gifts), and cash rewards, (e.g., gift certificates, cash bonus) (α = .75, 
ICC(1)= .13, ICC(2)= .76). 
Control variables.  We controlled for regional location in all models because union 
contracts and ownership patterns of the former Bell companies vary by these geographic areas.  
4.  Results 
Table 1 contains the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the study variables.   
Several regional control variables are significant.  This helps explain why correlations among 
the variables of interest are not significant, because the variation across regions is large and 
must be taken into account in order to examine the relationships of interest.  
In our analyses below, we first examine revenue generation as the dependent variable in 
relation to HR practices, service quality, and call handling time.  We then analyze net revenue 
generation using the same model, but with the exclusion of call handling time because net 
revenues takes into consideration all costs per call, including variation associated with call 
handling time. 
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Table 1: 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations 
                    
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1.  Revenues per call  1.00                   
2.  Call handling time -0.02  1.00                 
3.  Service quality -0.23  0.11   1.00               
4.  Training hours 0.06  -0.02  0.22 † 1.00           
   
5.  Discretion 0.24 † -0.11  0.26 * -0.03  1.00         
   
6.  Rewards -0.10  0.09  0.24 † 0.13  0.17  1.00          
7.  Region 1 -0.08  -0.27 * 0.46 ** 0.13  0.20 † 0.06  1.00        
8.  Region 2 0.14  -0.25  -0.21 -0.03  -0.13  0.21 † -0.17  1.00      
9.  Region 3 0.42 ** -0.12  -0.55 ** -0.03  0.13  -0.07  -0.30 ** -0.25 * 1.00    
10. Region 4 -0.32 * 0.65 ** 0.27 * -0.07  0.00  0.03  -0.22 † -0.18  -0.33
 
**
 
1.00
 
Means 77.12   416.93   4.16  1.81  3.5   -3.13   0.16   0.12   0.32
  
0.19
 
Standard Deviations 12.47   32.48   0.13  0.85  0.41   0.49   0.37   0.33   0.47
  
0.40
 
NOTE:  ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10             
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In hypothesis 1, we stated that the call center human resource practices of training, 
customer discretion, and rewards should be positively related to service quality and economic 
outcomes.  Hypothesis 2 stated that service quality should partially mediate the relationship 
between HR practices and economic outcomes, which we tested using path analysis.  
Hypothesis 3 states that call handling time will be positively related to revenue generation. 
Our findings provide partial support for hypothesis 1.  Discretion with customers is 
significantly positively related to service quality (0.32, p < .01) and revenues per call (0.25, p < 
.01).  Rewards are significantly related to service quality (0.22, p < .05).  In addition, the amount 
of training is positively related to service quality (0.16) and approaches statistical significance (p. 
< .06).   None of the human resource practices are significantly related to call handling time. 
With respect to hypothesis 2, service quality is positively related to revenues per call 
(0.16), and approaches statistical significance (p < .06), suggesting that it partially mediates the 
relationship between human resource practices and revenue generation.   Figure 2 shows the 
standardized coefficients and significant paths for our hypothesized partial mediation model.   
With respect to hypothesis 3, average call handling time is significantly positively related 
to revenues per call (0.43, p < .01), as expected.   That is, longer call handling, or lower labor 
efficiency, is associated with higher net revenues.  We suspect that this positive relationship is 
explained by the fact that processing fairly complex sales transactions takes time but yields 
higher value.  However, we considered an alternative hypothesis that the relationship might be 
curvilinear, such that longer call handling time produces diminishing returns.  However, the 
estimates for a curvilinear relationship were not significant. 
In general, the goodness of fit indices show that the partial model fits the data relatively 
well, although the RMSEA statistic does not (χ2 = . 149.86, df=30; IFI=.94; CFI=.94; NFI=.92) 
(Bentler and Bonett 1980).  These findings provide partial support for hypothesis 2.  They 
suggest that human resource practices have a significant positive effect on revenue generation, 
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both directly, and indirectly through their effect on service quality.   The fit statistics for the path 
analysis are shown in Table 2.  
 
Figure 2 
Partial Mediation Path Analysis: HR Practices, Operational Outcomes, and Revenues per Call 
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Note: standardized coefficients are shown. 
Significant paths are in bold. 
Regional control variables not shown. 
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 Table 2 
 
Alternative Path Model Comparison (N=64) 
 
Model CFI IFI NFI RMSEA AIC BCC χ2, df 
Difference 
from 
Model 1 
Model 1: (Figure 2) 
Partial mediation model .94 .94 .92 .20 219.86 230.48 
149.65, 
30 -- 
Model 2: (Figure 3) 
Full mediation model .94 .94 .92 .23 218.47 230.02 
154.47, 
33 4.82, 3 
Model 3: 
Direct Effect Model .93 .93 .91 .23 232.47 242.21 
169.31, 
38 19.66, 8* 
Model 4: 
Trimmed full mediation 
model (final model) 
.94 .94 .92 .22 213.99 224.46 155.99, 36 
Difference 
from 
Model 2: 
1.52, 3 
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We examined alternative path models by using chi-square difference tests and several 
goodness-of-fit indices, including CFI, NFI, and RMSEA (Hu & Bentler, 1995), as shown in 
Table 2.  Model 2 is a full mediation model (removing the paths between human resource 
practices and revenues).  Model 3 is a direct effect model (removing paths between HR 
practices and call time and HR practices and service quality).  Compared to Model 1 (the partial 
mediation model), the full mediation model is not significantly different in fit nor in the path 
relationships, although the path between service quality and revenues is more significant.  The 
direct effect model has a significantly worse fit (Model 3 diff χ2 = 19.66, df=8, p <.01; See Table 
2).  These results indicate that the overall fit of the partial and full mediation models is 
comparable. 
Figure 3   
Full Mediation Path Analysis: HR Practices, Service Quality, and Revenues per Call  
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The partial and full mediation models also tell a similar story in which human resource 
practices that emphasize training, discretion, and rewards lead to higher service quality, which 
in turn predicts higher revenues.  Given the similar findings for the partial and full mediation 
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models, we would conclude that the full mediation model represents the most appropriate model 
because it is the most parsimonious.   
In Figure 4, we turn to the question of whether the size and significance of our findings 
hold when net revenues are the dependent variable.  The results are very similar to those found 
in models 1 and 2.  The relationship between the human resource practices and service quality 
are similar in magnitude and significance to the first models; and service quality mediates the 
relationship between HR practices and net revenues. 
Figure 4   
Full Mediation Model: HR Practices, Service Quality, and Net Revenues per Call 
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Note: standardized coefficients are shown. 
Significant paths are in bold. 
Regional control variables not shown. 
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Chi-square = 110.499 
Degrees of freedom = 25 
CFI: .94 
IFI:  .95 
NFI: .93 
RMSEA: .22 
 
In terms of the magnitude of the significant relationships, Figure 4 shows the 
standardized estimates for the full mediation model with net revenues as the dependent 
variable. Standardized path coefficients are interpreted the same way as beta weights.  For 
example, the standardized path coefficient of .21 for the direct effect of training on service 
quality means that service quality is expected to improve by .21 SD, given a change in training 
of 1 SD, when controlling for discretion and rewards.   
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Indirect effects are calculated as the product of the direct effects (between HR practices 
and service quality and between service quality and economic outcomes).  Thus, the indirect 
effect of training on net revenues is 0.09 (.21*.45=.09).  The indirect effect of customer 
discretion via service quality is 0.14 (.31*.45 =.14).  The indirect effect of rewards via service 
quality is 0.10 (.22 *.45 = .10).  Thus the total effect of human resource practices on net 
revenues is 0.35.   These are not significantly different from the results found in model 2.  
To translate these values into real dollar terms, we use the unstandardized path 
coefficients.  For net revenue calculations, the unstandardized path coefficient for service quality 
to net revenues per call is 58.  The unstandardized coefficients of training, customer discretion, 
and rewards on service quality are .032, .096, and .058 respectively.  Thus, the indirect effect of 
training on net revenues is $1.86 (.032*$58.29), of discretion is $5.60 (.096*$58.29), and of 
rewards is $3.38 (.058*$58.29).  Thus the total effect of HR practices on average net revenues 
per call via service quality is $10.84.  On average, call centers in this study handled 58,620 calls 
per month.  The median call center handled 53,700 calls.  The average net revenues per call is 
$68.91.  Variation in HR practices accounts for $10.84 in net revenues per call, or about 15.7 
percent of net revenues.   Given these call volumes, $10.84 in additional net revenues per call is 
a non-trivial amount.  
5.  Discussion 
In this paper we have explored the relationship between human resource practices, 
operational performance metrics of labor efficiency and service quality, and economic 
performance in call centers.  The findings suggest that call centers that provide employees with 
training, with discretion to use their judgment with customers, and with rewards to do so, have 
significantly higher service quality and higher net revenues.  In addition, these human resource 
practices lead to higher net revenues through their effect on service quality.   By contrast, 
human resource practices are unrelated to labor efficiency, and lower labor efficiency is 
associated with higher revenues per call. 
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These findings contribute to our understanding of human resource practices and service 
management strategies in a number of ways.  First, they show that even in price-conscious 
markets, competing on the basis of service quality pays off.  This finding is consistent with the 
idea that mass customization (Pine, 1993) is a viable strategy for consumer markets that offer 
opportunities for bundling products and services.  Despite the fact that companies do need to 
worry about cost pressures, they can compete effectively by focusing on revenue generation – 
and by taking advantage of opportunities to customize offerings to mass market consumers.  
The current study involves call centers in telecommunications services.  The service offerings in 
these centers do not involve high levels of complexity or customization; however, there are 
enough opportunities for packaging services to fit different consumer demand profiles that 
investment in the skills and abilities of the workforce appears to pay off.  If we consider 
comparable environments and levels of task complexity, then we expect that our findings would 
generalize to call centers serving mass market consumers in industries such as financial 
services, health care, manufacturing industries, public sector services, and print and media 
services.  We expect that they would generalize less favorably to call centers involving very 
simple transactions, such as outbound telemarketing or perhaps retail commodities. 
Second, the findings show that a narrow focus on labor efficiency as a driver of 
performance is misguided.  We believe this finding is particularly important in the context of call 
centers because our field research has shown us that companies routinely place a high value 
on minimizing call handling time and maximizing the number of customers per employee per 
day.  Our results suggest that such a focus is probably the wrong business model.  It is not the 
volume of output per labor input that is important, but rather the value generated in service 
interactions that is a meaningful measure of productivity.  Human resource practices that 
provided greater skills, discretion, and incentives to employees allowed them to maximize 
customer service quality and net revenue generation.  Third, by taking the costs of production 
into account in the context of price-conscious markets, we provide some evidence to counter 
the argument that investing in human resource practices is too costly in these environments.   
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Finally, our results show that even in a tightly constrained production system – in this 
case call centers with highly standardized technology and the same overall corporate strategy – 
variation in managerial choice matters.  If the relationships between human resource practices, 
service quality, and economic outcomes hold in this environment, we believe they are likely to 
generalize to other environments in which there are more opportunities for managerial discretion 
and more opportunities to compete on service quality. 
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